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Abstract
We characterize the optimal incentive scheme for a manager who faces costly e⁄ort decisions
and whose ability to generate pro￿ts for the ￿rm varies stochastically over time. The optimal
contract is obtained as the solution to a dynamic mechanism design problem with hidden actions
and persistent shocks to the agent￿ s productivity. When the agent is risk-neutral, the optimal
contract can often be implemented with a simple pay package that is linear in the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts.
Furthermore, the power of the incentive scheme typically increases over time, thus providing a
possible justi￿cation for the frequent practice of putting more stocks and options in the package
of managers with a longer tenure in the ￿rm. In contrast to other explanations proposed in the
literature (e.g., declining disutility of e⁄ort or career concerns), the optimality of seniority-based
reward schemes is not driven by variations in the agent￿ s preferences or in his outside option.
It results from an optimal allocation of the manager￿ s informational rents over time. Building
on the insights from the risk-neutral case, we then explore the properties of optimal incentive
schemes for risk-averse managers. We ￿nd that, other things equal, risk-aversion reduces the
bene￿t of inducing higher e⁄ort over time. Whether (risk-averse) managers with a longer tenure
receive more or less high-powered incentives than younger ones then depends on the interaction
between the degree of risk aversion and the dynamics of the impulse responses for the shocks to
the manager￿ s type.
JEL classi￿cation: D82
Keywords: dynamic mechanism design, adverse selection, moral hazard, incentives, optimal pay
scheme, risk-aversion, stochastic process.
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This paper contributes to the literature on managerial compensation by adopting a mechanism
design approach to characterize the dynamics of the optimal incentive scheme.
We consider an environment in which the ￿rm￿ s shareholders (the principal) hire a manager
(the agent) whose ability to generate pro￿ts for the ￿rm varies stochastically over time. This could
re￿ ect, for example, the possibility that the value of the manager￿ s expertise/competence changes
in response to variations in the business environment. It could also be the result of learning by
doing. We assume that both the manager￿ s ability to generate pro￿ts (his type) as well as his
e⁄ort choices are the manager￿ s private information. The ￿rm￿ s shareholders simply observe the
dynamics of pro￿ts (equivalently, the value of their shares), which we assume to be veri￿able, and
pay the manager on the basis of this information.
Contrary to the literature on renegotiation (e.g. La⁄ont and Tirole, 1988, 1990), we assume
that the ￿rm￿ s shareholders perfectly understand the value of commitment and hence adhere to
the incentive scheme they o⁄ered when they hired the manager, even if, after certain contingencies,
such a scheme need not be optimal anymore. However, contrary to this literature, we do not impose
restrictions on the process governing the evolution of the agent￿ s private information. In particular,
we do not restrict the agent￿ s type to be constant over time, nor do we restrict the agent￿ s types
to be independent. Allowing for general processes is important for it permits us to shed light
on certain properties of the optimal scheme that are obscured, if not completely eliminated, by
assuming perfectly correlated, or independent types (more below).
Our baseline model features an environment where both the ￿rm￿ s shareholders and the man-
ager are risk-neutral. Because the ￿rm contracts with the manager at the time the latter is already
privately informed about his type, interesting dynamics emerge even without introducing risk aver-
sion. In particular, we show that the power of incentives typically increases over time, which can
explain the frequent practice of putting more stocks and options in the pay package of managers
with a longer tenure in the ￿rm. Contrary to other explanations proposed in the literature (e.g.,
declining disutility of e⁄ort or career concerns), in our model, the optimality of seniority-based
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side option. It results from an optimal allocation of the manager￿ s informational rents over time.
In other words, it originates in the ￿rm￿ s desire to minimize the manager￿ s compensation while
preserving his incentives for both e⁄ort and information revelation.
The driving assumption behind this result is that the e⁄ect of the manager￿ s initial type on
the distribution of his future types (which we call the impulse response) declines over time. This
assumption is satis￿ed, for instance, when the agent￿ s private information evolves according to
an ARIMA process with impulse responses smaller than one. As discussed also in other recent
works on dynamic mechanism design (e.g. Battaglini, 2005, Pavan, Segal, and Toikka, 2009(a))
this assumption implies that, to minimize the agent￿ s rents, it is more e¢ cient to distort decisions
downwards in the early stages of the relationship than in later ones. The reason is that an agent￿ s
rent, which is provided to ensure he does not mimic another type, depends on the di⁄erent expec-
tations the two types have about their future types. When this di⁄erence declines with the time
horizon, distorting decisions in the distant future becomes less e⁄ective at reducing informational
rents. When applied to the situation studied in this paper, this principle of ￿vanishing distortions￿
leads to an e⁄ort policy that is closer to the ￿rst-best in the long run than in the short run. This
follows from the fact that a type￿ s rent increases in the e⁄ort of lower types, as shown by La⁄ont
and Tirole (1986) in a static setting.
A second prediction of the model is that the optimal contract under risk neutrality often takes
the form of a simple (state-contingent) linear contract. In other words, in each period, the ￿rm pays
the manager a ￿xed salary plus a bonus that is linear in the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts (or, equivalently, in the
￿rm￿ s stock price, provided the latter also depends on the manager￿ s e⁄ort). When the manager￿ s
type follows an ARIMA process (more generally, any process where the impulse responses exhibit
a certain separability with respect to the initial type), the slope of the linear scheme changes
deterministically over time, i.e. it depends on the manager￿ s initial type and on the number of
periods the manager has been working for the ￿rm, but not on the shocks experienced over time.
More generally, the optimal contract requires that the manager be given the possibility of
3proposing changes to his pay package in response to the shocks to his productivity (equivalently,
to any privately observed shock to the environment that a⁄ects his ability to generate pro￿ts for
the ￿rm). The idea that a manager may be given the possibility to propose changes to his reward
package seems appealing in light of the recent empirical literature on managerial compensation
where it is found that this practice has become more frequent in the last decade (see, among
others, Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2008), and Bebchuck and Fried (2004)).
While, under risk neutrality, the optimality of linear schemes holds across a variety of speci￿-
cations of the process governing the evolution of the manager￿ s productivity, there are instances
where the optimal e⁄ort policy requires the use of stronger incentive schemes according to which
the manager is paid a bonus only when the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts exceed a certain threshold, where this
threshold may depend on the history of the manager￿ s reports about his type. While the power of
these schemes is stronger, contrary to linear schemes, these ￿bonus￿schemes would not be appro-
priate when pro￿ts are the result not only of the manager￿ s type and e⁄ort, but also of unobservable
noise shocks whose distribution is una⁄ected by the manager￿ s e⁄ort.
Building on the insights from the risk-neutral case, in the second part of the paper we explore
the properties of optimal incentive schemes for risk-averse managers. We ￿nd that risk-aversion
tends to reduce (but not necessarily eliminate) the bene￿ts of seniority-based incentive schemes
whose power increases, on average, over time. The reason is that the uncertainty the agent faces
about his future productivity given his current productivity increases with the time horizon. In
other words, while the agent￿ s current type is a fairly good predictor of his type in the next period,
it is a fairly poor predictor of his type, say, ￿ve periods into the future. Furthermore, because
incentives are forward-looking, the sensitivity of the agent￿ s pay to his productivity in period t is
increasing in all future e⁄ort levels and is independent of past e⁄ort choices. Reducing e⁄ort in
the far future is thus more e⁄ective at reducing the agent￿ s overall exposure to risk than reducing
e⁄ort in the present or in the near future. Other things equal, risk aversion thus makes it more
attractive for the principal to induce higher e⁄ort in the early stages of the relationship, when the
agent faces little uncertainty about his ability to generate pro￿ts, than in later periods, where this
4uncertainty (as perceived from the moment the contract is signed) is higher. Whether risk-averse
managers with a longer tenure receive more or less high-powered incentive schemes than younger
ones then depends on the interaction between the degree of risk-aversion and the impulse responses
for the shocks to the manager￿ s type.
Related literature.1 The literature on managerial compensation is too large to be successfully
summarized within the context of this paper. We refer to Prendergast (1999) for an excellent review
and to Edmans and Gabaix (2009) for a survey of some recent developments. Of particular interest
for our paper is the empirical literature on the use of seniority-based incentive schemes. This
literature ￿nds mixed evidence as to the e⁄ect of tenure on performance-related pay. While some
papers suggest that managers with a longer tenure tend to have weaker incentives and explain this
by the fact that the board of directors tends to be captured by CEOs over time (e.g. Hill and
Phan, 1991), others point to the contrary (see, e.g., Lippert and Porter, 1997, but also Gibbons
and Murphy, 1991). As one would expect, these di⁄erences often originate in the choices about
which incentives are relevant (e.g. whether to consider stock options). At the theoretical level, our
paper contributes to this literature by o⁄ering a new trade-o⁄ for the optimality of seniority-based
incentives that, to the best of our knowledge, was not noticed before.
Obviously the paper is also related to the literature on ￿dynamic moral hazard￿ and to its
application to dynamic managerial compensation. Seminal works in this literature include Lambert
(1983), Rogerson (1985) and Spear and Srivastava (1987). These works provide some qualitative
insights about the optimal policy, but do not provide a full characterization. This has been possible
only in restricted settings: Phelan and Townsend (1991) characterize optimal policies numerically in
a discrete-time model, while Sannikov (2008) uses a continuous-time setting with Brownian shocks
to characterize the optimal policy as the solution to a di⁄erential equation. In contrast to these
results, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show that the optimal contract has a simple structure
when (a) the agent does not value the timing of payments, (b) noise follows a Brownian motion
and (c) the agent￿ s utility is exponential; under these assumptions, the optimal contract is a simple
1This part is even more preliminary than the rest. We apologize to those who believe their work should have been
cited here and that we omitted to discuss.
5linear aggregator of aggregate pro￿t.
Contrary to this literature, we assume that, in each period, the agent observes the shock to his
productivity before choosing e⁄ort. In this respect, the paper is most closely related to La⁄ont
and Tirole (1986). This alternative approach permits one to use techniques from the mechanism
design literature to solve for the optimal contract. In work independent from ours, Edmans and
Gabaix (2008) show how this approach can be applied to a dynamic setting, allowing for risk
aversion. However, they do not characterize the optimal e⁄ort policy, nor which policies are imple-
mentable.2 Allowing for general processes and characterizing the optimal e⁄ort policies is essential
to establishing results about the dynamics of the power of incentives and the optimality of linear,
or quasi-linear, schemes. Characterizing the optimal e⁄ort policy also shows that details about
the agent￿ s preferences and the process for the shocks do matter for the structure of the optimal
contract.
From a methodological standpoint, our paper uses recent results from the dynamic mechanism
design literature to arrive to a characterization of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for incen-
tive compatibility. In particular, the approach here builds on the techniques developed in Pavan,
Segal, and Toikka (2009,a,b). This paper provides a general treatment of dynamic mechanism
design in which the principal has full commitment, and the agent￿ s type may be correlated across
time. It extends previous work, for example by Besanko (1985) and Battaglini (2005), to a setting
with fairly general payo⁄s and stochastic processes. We refer the reader to Pavan, Segal, and Toikka
(2009,a) for a more extensive review of the dynamic mechanism design literature.
An important dimension in which the paper makes some progress is the characterization of
optimal mechanisms under risk aversion and correlated information. In this respect, the paper is
also related to the literature on optimal dynamic taxation (also known as Mirrleesian taxation).
Battaglini and Coate (2008) consider a discrete-time-two-type model with Markov transitions and
show continuity in the optimal mechanism as preferences converge to risk neutrality. Zhang (2009)
considers a model with ￿nitely many types, but where contracting occurs in continuous-time and
2Other di⁄erences are that (a) they restrict attention to e⁄ort policies that depend at most on the current shocks,
and (b) they assume contracting occurs at a time the agent does not possess any private information.
6where the arrival rate of the transitions between types follows a Poisson process. For most of the
analysis, he also restricts attention to two types and ￿nds that many of the results derived for
the i.i.d. case (studied, for instance, by Albanesi and Sleet, 2006) carry over to the environment
with persistent types. In particular, the celebrated ￿immiserization result￿according to which con-
sumption converges to its lower bound, extends to a setting with correlated types. One qualitative
di⁄erence with respect to the i.i.d. case is that the size of the ￿wedges￿ , i.e. the distortions due to
the agent￿ s private information, is signi￿cantly larger when types are persistent. Consistent with
Battaglini and Coate (2006), he also ￿nds that, contrary to the risk-neutral case, distortions do
not vanish as soon as the agent becomes a high type.
Our results appear broadly consistent with the aforementioned ￿ndings from the dynamic op-
timal taxation literature; however, by allowing for a continuum of types and by considering fairly
general stochastic processes, we also uncover patterns of distortions that have not been noticed be-
fore (e.g. the possibility that, under risk aversion and su¢ ciently persistent shocks, e⁄ort actually
declines over time, as it is the case when productivity follows a random walk). The techniques
used to arrive to the characterization of the optimal contract are also di⁄erent from those in the
literature with ￿nitely many types.
Lastly, the paper relates to the literature on the optimal use of ￿nancial instruments in dynamic
principal-agent relationships. For instance, DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006) and Sannikov (2007)3 study optimal ￿nancial contracts for a manager who privately ob-
serves the dynamics of cash-￿ ows and can divert funds from investors for private consumption. In
these papers it is typically optimal to induce the highest possible e⁄ort (which is equivalent to no
stealing/no saving); the instrument which is then used to create incentives is the probability of
terminating the project. One of the key ￿ndings is that the optimal contract can often be imple-
mented using long-term debt, a credit line, and equity. The equity component represents a linear
component to the incentive scheme which is used to make the agent indi⁄erent as to whether or
not to divert funds for private use. Since the agent￿ s cost of diverting funds is constant across time
3As in our work, and contrary to the other papers cited here, Sannikov (2007) allows the agent to possess some
private information prior to signing the contract. Assuming the agent￿ s initial type can be either "bad" or "good",
he then characterizes the optimal separating menu where only good types are funded.
7and output realizations, so is the equity share. In contrast, we provide an explanation for why and
how this share typically changes over time. While these two papers suppose cash-￿ ows are i.i.d.,
Tchistyi (2006) explores the consequences of correlation and shows that the optimal contract can
be implemented using a credit line with an interest that increases with the balance. DeMarzo and
Sannikov (2008) consider an environment in which both investors and the agent learn about the
￿rm￿ s true productivity (which evolves according to a Brownian motion). In this paper, as in ours,
the agent￿ s private information is correlated over time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model. Section 2.2
characterizes the optimal mechanism. Section 3 extends the analysis to settings where the optimal
e⁄ort policy is contingent on the entire history of shocks. Section 4 examines optimal schemes for
risk-averse agents. All proofs omitted in the text are in the Appendix.
2 The Baseline Model
2.1 The environment
The ￿rm￿ s shareholders (hereafter referred to as the principal) hire a manager (the agent) to work
on a project over T periods, where T may be either ￿nite or in￿nite. In each period t, the agent
receives some private information ￿t 2 ￿t about the environment or, equivalently, about his ability
to generate pro￿ts for the ￿rm, and then chooses e⁄ort level et 2 E ￿ R. We will assume that
￿t ￿ R is either equal to [￿t;￿ ￿t] or, in case ￿ ￿t = +1, to [￿t;￿ ￿t) ￿ R for some ￿1 < ￿t ￿ ￿ ￿t ￿ +1.4
To simplify the exposition (and facilitate the characterization of the optimal e⁄ort policy) we
will assume that E = R.5
The principal￿ s pro￿ts ￿t in period t, gross of any agent compensation, depend on the sequence
of e⁄ort decisions et ￿ (es)t
s=1 chosen by the agent in previous periods and on the agent￿ s current
4As it will become clear from the analysis in the subsequent sections, that ￿t is bounded from below is to guarantee
that expected payo⁄s, when expressed taking incentives into account, are well de￿ned.
5That e⁄ort can take negative values should not raise concerns: here, e simply stands for the e⁄ect of the agent￿ s
activity on the ￿rm￿ s performance, so there is no reason to restrict it to be positive.
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for some constant ￿ ￿ 0 that captures the persistence of the e⁄ect of the manager￿ s e⁄ort on the
￿rm￿ s pro￿ts. The set of possible period-t pro￿ts will be denoted by
￿t ￿ f￿t 2 R : ￿t = ￿t + et +
t￿1 X
￿=1
￿￿et￿￿; ￿t 2 ￿t, es 2 E; 8s ￿ tg
Both ￿t and et are the agent￿ s private information. On the contrary, the stream of pro￿ts ￿t are
assumed to be veri￿able, which implies that the agent can be rewarded as a function of the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿ts.
As is common in the literature, we equate the agent￿ s period-t consumption ct with the payment
from the principal (in other words, we assume away the possibility of hidden savings). Such a
restriction is, however, without loss of generality under the assumption of risk-neutrality considered
in this section.
In each period, the principal may condition the agent￿ s payment on the entire history of pro￿ts
￿t. By choosing e⁄ort et in period t, the agent su⁄ers a disutility  (et). To ensure interior solutions
and to validate a certain dynamic envelope theorem (more below), we will assume that   is a
continuously di⁄erentiable function and that there exist scalars ￿ e 2 R++ and K 2 R++ such that
 (e) = 0 for all e < 0;   is thrice continuously di⁄erentiable over (0; ￿ e) with  00(e) > 0 and
 000(e) ￿ 0 for all e 2 (0; ￿ e) and  (e) = Ke for all e > ￿ e.8
The agent￿ s preferences over (lotteries over) streams of consumption levels cT and streams of




￿t￿1[ct ￿  (et)] (1)
6From now on, we adopt the convention of denoting sequences of variables by their superscripts.
7Note that because ￿t is not restricted to be independent of the past shocks ￿
t￿1 ￿ (￿1;:::;￿t￿1), there is no loss
of generality in assuming that ￿t depends only on ￿t, as opposed to the entire history ￿
t = (￿1;:::;￿t): To see this,
suppose that ￿t = ft(￿
t)+ht(e
t) for some functions ft : R
t ! R and ht : R
t ! R: It then su¢ ces to change variables




8These conditions are satis￿ed e.g. when ￿ e = K and  (e) = (1=2)e
2 for all e 2 [0; ￿ e]. More generally, note that
the assumption that  
000 ￿ 0 guarantees that the principal￿ s relaxed program, as de￿ned below, is concave.
9where ￿ < 1 is a discount factor. As standard, the aforementioned speci￿cation presumes time
consistency. In what follows, we will thus assume that, after each history ht, the agent maximizes
the expectation of UA(cT;eT); where the expectation is taken with respect to whatever information
is available to the agent after history ht.





￿t￿1 [￿t ￿ ct]:
The function UP also corresponds to the principal￿ s Bermoulli function used to evaluate lotteries
over (￿T;cT).
Throughout, we will also assume that ￿￿ < 1 and that K > 1 +
PT￿1
s=1 (￿￿)s:
In each period t, ￿t is drawn from a cumulative distribution function Ft(￿j￿t￿1) de￿ned on ￿t.9
Below, we will often ￿nd it convenient to describe the evolution of the agent￿ s type through a
collection of functions of independent shocks. More precisely, let (~ "t)
T
t=2 denote a collection of
random variables, each distributed according to the c.d.f. Gt, strictly increasing on the interval
Et ￿ R, where Et = ["t￿ "t] if ￿ "t < +1 and ["t;￿ "t) if ￿ "t = +1 for some ￿1 < et ￿ ￿ "t ￿ +1;
and such that (~ ￿1;~ "T) are jointly independent.10 Then, let (zt(￿))T
t=2 denote a collection of real-
valued functions such that, for any t ￿ 2, any ￿1 and any "t￿1 2 Et￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1
s=2Es; the distribution
of zt(￿1;("t￿1;~ "t)) given (￿1;"t￿1) is the same as that of ￿t given ￿t￿1 = zt￿1(￿1;"t￿1), where
zt￿1(￿1;"t￿1) ￿ (￿1;z2(￿1;"2);:::;zt￿1(￿1;"t￿1)): As indicated in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka, 2009(b),
any stochastic process (i.e. any collection of kernels F = hFt(￿j￿)i
T
t=1) admits at least one such
representation.
We initially restrict attention to processes for which each zt is separable in its ￿rst component.
De￿nition 1 The process for (~ ￿t)T
t=1 given by the kernels
F ￿
￿
Ft : ￿t￿1 ! ￿(￿t)
￿T
t=1




, any s > t; E[j~ ￿sj j ￿
t] < +1.
10The reason for restricting "t > ￿1 is the same as for restricting ￿t to be bounded from below; it guarantees
that the agent￿ s payo⁄ in any incentive compatible mechanism can be conveniently expressed in integral form.
10is separable in the ￿rst component (SFC) if it admits an independent-shock representation such
that for each t ￿ 2, the function zt : ￿1 ￿ Et ! ￿t takes the form
zt(￿1;"t) = ￿t(￿1) + ￿t("2;:::;"t)
for some functions ￿t : ￿1 ! R and ￿t : Et ! R.
The set of SFC processes is quite large and it includes for example all moving average processes,
and more generally any ARIMA process with arbitrary parameters.
2.2 The mechanism design problem
The principal￿ s problem consists of choosing a mechanism detailing for each period t a recommen-
dation for the agent￿ s e⁄ort et and a level of consumption ct that depend on the sequence of realized
pro￿ts ￿t and (possibly) on a sequence of messages about the environment sent by the agent over
time.
By the revelation principle, we restrict attention to direct mechanisms for which a truthful and
obedient strategy is optimal for the agent. Let ￿t ￿ ￿t
￿=1￿￿ and ￿t = ￿t
￿=1￿￿. A (deterministic)
direct mechanism ￿ = h￿t;stiT
t=1 consists of a collection of functions ￿t : ￿t￿￿t￿1 ! E and st : ￿t￿
￿t ! R such that ￿t(￿t;￿t￿1) is the recommended level of e⁄ort for period t given the agent￿ s reports
￿t and the observed past pro￿ts ￿t￿1, while st(￿t;￿t￿1;￿t) is the principal￿ s payment (i.e. the agent￿ s
consumption) at the end of period t given the reports ￿t and the observed pro￿ts ￿t = (￿t￿1;￿t):
Note that st(￿t;￿t￿1;￿t) depends also on the current performance ￿t: Equivalently, the mechanism
￿ speci￿es for each period t and each history (￿t;￿t￿1) a recommended e⁄ort level ￿t(￿t;￿t￿1)
along with a contingent payment scheme st(￿t;￿t￿1;￿) : ￿t ! R. With a slight abuse of notation,
henceforth we will denote by et(￿t) ￿ ￿t(￿t;￿t￿1(￿t￿1)) and by ct(￿t) = st(￿t;￿t(￿t)) respectively
the equilibrium e⁄ort and the equilibrium consumption level for period t given ￿t; where ￿t(￿t) =
(￿s(￿s))t
s=1 with ￿s(￿s) de￿ned recursively by ￿s(￿s) = ￿s +
Ps￿1
￿=0 ￿￿￿s￿￿(￿s￿￿;￿s￿￿￿1(￿s￿￿￿1)):
The timing of play in each period t is the following:
￿ At the beginning of period t; the agent learns ￿t 2 ￿t;
11￿ The agent then sends a report ^ ￿t 2 ￿t;
￿ Finally, the mechanism reacts by prescribing an e⁄ort choice et = ￿t(￿t;￿t￿1) and a reward
scheme st(￿t;￿t￿1;￿) : ￿t ! R:
The mechanism ￿ is o⁄ered to the agent at date 1; after he has observed the ￿rst realization ￿1
of the process governing the evolution of ￿t:11 If the agent refuses to participate in the mechanism
￿; then both the agent and the principal receive their outside options, which we assume to be
equal to zero. If, instead, the agent accepts ￿; then he is obliged to stay in the relationship in all
subsequent periods.12
Because we will often ￿nd it convenient to describe the evolution of the agent￿ s type through an
independent-shock representation (described above), hereafter, we will also consider direct mech-
anisms in which the agent reports the shocks "t in each period t ￿ 2 instead of his period-t type
￿t. We will then denote such mechanisms by ^ ￿ = h^ ￿t; ^ stiT
t=1 where ^ ￿t : ￿1 ￿ Et ￿ ￿t￿1 ! E and
^ st : ￿1 ￿ Et ￿ ￿t ! R have the same interpretation as the mappings ￿t and st in the primitive
representation (the one in terms of the ￿t). Likewise, we will denote by ^ ct(￿1;"t) and by ^ et(￿1;"t)
the consumption and e⁄ort choices that are implemented in equilibrium given (￿1;"t):
The optimal mechanism
To ease the understanding of the properties of the optimal mechanism, we start by considering the
optimal e⁄ort policy in the absence of any private information.13
Proposition 1 Assume the agent does not possess any private information, i.e. both the evolution
of the environment (as captured by the process for ￿t) and the agent￿ s e⁄ort choices eT are publicly
observable and veri￿able. The optimal contract for the principal then implements the following
11Allowing the agent to possess private information at the time of contracting is not only realistic, but essential to
shed light on important aspects of the optimal contract such as the time-varying power of incentives. Furthermore,
it permits one to derive interesting dynamics, even without assuming the agent is risk-averse.
12That participation must be guaranteed only in period one is clearly not restrictive when the principal can ask the
agent to post bonds. Below, we will discuss also situations/implementations where, even in the absence of bonding,
participation can be guaranteed after any history.
13Given the assumptions on  ; e
FB
t 2 (0; ￿ e) for all t.
12e⁄ort policy:
 0(eFB





In particular, when T = +1; the optimal e⁄ort is stationary over time and is implicitly given
by  0(eFB) = 1=[1 ￿ ￿￿]: Likewise, the optimal e⁄ort is constant and given by  0(eFB) = 1 when
the manager￿ s e⁄ort has only a transitory e⁄ect on the ￿rm￿ s performance, i.e. when ￿ = 0:
That the ￿rst-best e⁄ort policy is independent of any variation in the underlying environment is a
consequence of the assumption of independence of the agent￿ s disutility of e⁄ort from the underlying
state ￿t:
Clearly, the same ￿rst-best e⁄ort policy is implemented in any environment in which the agent￿ s
initial type ￿1 is publicly observed and veri￿able (equivalently, in any environment in which the
agent contracts with the principal before learning ￿1), irrespective of the observability of e⁄ort
choices and future shocks ￿t.14
Next, consider the case where the agent possesses relevant private information. Thus assume
that both the evolution of the environment (as captured by the process for ￿t) and the agent￿ s e⁄ort
choices are the agent￿ s private information. In addition, suppose that contracting between the agent
and the principal occurs at a time at which the agent is already informed about his period-1 type
￿1. The following proposition presents the main characterization result for this environment.
Proposition 2 Assume the process governing the evolution of ￿t satis￿es the SFC condition and
that, for each t, ￿t(￿) is di⁄erentiable and there exists M 2 R+ such that supt fj￿0
t(￿1)jg ￿ M for




1(￿1) ￿ 1, and suppose that for any t; any ￿1; D1;t(￿1) ￿ 0: Finally, assume that F1 is absolutely
continuous with density f1(￿1) > 0 for all ￿1 2 ￿1 and denote by ￿(￿1) ￿ [1 ￿ F1(￿1)]=f1(￿1) its
inverse hazard rate. Then consider the e⁄ort policy ^ e￿ implicitly de￿ned, for all t all ￿1, by15
 0(^ e￿




s ￿ ￿(￿1)D1;t(￿1) 00(^ e￿
t(￿1)) 8￿1; 8t ￿ 1; (2)
14As we will show below, this property is however a consequence of the assumption of transferable utility, i.e. of
the fact that both the agent￿ s and the principal￿ s preferences are linear in the transfers ct.
15Throughout,  
00









=[￿(￿1)D1;t(￿1)] in which case ^ e￿
t(￿1) = 0:
1. For any t and any ￿1 let
￿t(￿1) ￿  0(^ e￿
t(￿1)) ￿ ￿￿ 0(^ e￿
t+1(￿1))
[if T is ￿nite, then ￿T(￿1) ￿  0(^ e￿






t(￿1)[￿t(￿1) ￿ ￿t(^ ￿1)]
#
[￿1 ￿ ^ ￿1] ￿ 0 8￿1;^ ￿1 2 ￿1. (3)
Then the recommendation policy
^ ￿
￿
t(￿1;"t;￿t￿1) = ^ e￿
t(￿1) 8(￿1;"t;￿t￿1) 2 ￿1 ￿ Et ￿ ￿t￿1
together with the output-contingent reward scheme de￿ned below are part of an optimal mech-
anism. The reward scheme is such that
^ s￿
1(￿1;￿1) = S1(￿1) + ￿1(￿1)￿1


























2. Suppose that for any t, either (a) ￿ = 0 and the function ￿(￿)D1;t(￿) is non-increasing, or (b)
 (e) = ke2=2 for all e 2 [0; ￿ e] and ￿(￿)[D1;t(￿) ￿ ￿￿D1;t+1(￿)] is non-increasing [if T is ￿nite,
then for t = T; ￿(￿)D1;T(￿) is non-increasing]. Then the e⁄ort policy ^ e￿ of part (1) satis￿es
the single-crossing condition (3).
14Because this is one of the main results in the paper and because many of the subsequent results
follow from arguments/techniques similar to those used to establish Proposition 2, the proof for
this result is given below instead of being relegated to the Appendix. The reader interested only in
the predictions of the model can however skip this proof and continue with the reading at page 21.
Proof. The structure of the proof is the following. Lemma 1 provides a necessary condition
for incentive compatibility based on the application of a dynamic envelope theorem (as in Pavan,
Segal, and Toikka, 2009(b)) to the agent￿ s optimization problem. Lemma 2 characterizes the e⁄ort
policy ^ e￿ that solves the principal￿ s relaxed problem, where the latter considers only the necessary
condition established in Lemma 1 (along with a certain participation constraint) and ignores all
remaining constraints. Lemma 3 shows that, when the solution to the relaxed program satis￿es the
single-crossing condition of (3), then (i) it can be implemented by the linear scheme described in the
proposition, (ii) under this scheme all types ￿nd it optimal to participate, and (iii) the lowest type
￿1 receives a zero expected payo⁄ in equilibrium. As discussed in more detail below, together these
properties guarantee that the e⁄ort policy ^ e￿ (equivalently, the recommendation policy ^ ￿
￿
) along
with the linear reward scheme ^ s￿ are part of an optimal mechanism. Finally, Lemma 4 completes
the proof by establishing the result in Part 2.
Given the mechanism ^ ￿ = h^ ￿; ^ si, let V
^ ￿(￿1) denote the value function when the agent￿ s period
one type is ￿1: This is simply the supremum of the agent￿ s expected payo⁄over all possible reporting
and e⁄ort strategies. The mechanism ^ ￿ is incentive compatible if V
^ ￿(￿1) coincides with the agent￿ s
expected payo⁄ under a truthful and obedient strategy for every ￿1 2 ￿1: We then have the
following result.
Lemma 1 The mechanism ^ ￿ is incentive compatible only if V
^ ￿(￿1) is Lipschitz continuous and,








￿t￿1D1;t(￿1) 0(^ et(￿1;~ "t))
#
:
Proof of the lemma. Consider the following ￿ctitious environment. At any point in time, the
agent can misreport his private information but is then ￿forced￿to choose e⁄ort so as to perfectly
15￿hide￿his lies. That is, at any period t, and for any given sequence of reports (^ ￿1;^ "t); the agent
must exert e⁄ort et so that ￿t = ^ ￿t(^ ￿1;^ "t), where ^ ￿t(^ ￿1;^ "t) is the equilibrium pro￿t for period t
given (^ ￿1;^ "t); as de￿ned in the Proposition. Now let
^ et(￿1;"t;^ ￿1;^ "t) = ^ ￿t(^ ￿1;^ "t) ￿ zt(￿1;"t) ￿ ￿
t￿1 X
￿=1
￿￿￿1^ et￿￿(￿1;"t￿￿;^ ￿1;^ "t￿￿) (4)
= ^ ￿t(^ ￿1;^ "t) ￿ zt(￿1;"t)
￿￿
 
^ et￿1(￿1;"t￿1;^ ￿1;^ "t￿1) +
t￿2 X
￿=1
￿￿^ et￿1￿￿(￿1;"t￿1￿￿;^ ￿1;^ "t￿1￿￿)
!
= ^ ￿t(^ ￿1;^ "t) ￿ zt(￿1;"t) ￿ ￿
￿
^ ￿t￿1(^ ￿1;^ "t￿1) ￿ zt￿1(￿1;"t￿1)
￿
denote the e⁄ort the agent must exert in period t to meet the target ^ ￿t(^ ￿1;^ "t) when his true type
is (￿1;"t) given that he met the targets (^ ￿s(^ ￿1;^ "s))t￿1
s=1 in all preceding periods, with e1(￿1;^ ￿1) =
^ ￿1(^ ￿1) ￿ ￿1.
Now ￿x (^ ￿1;^ "T) and let (^ cT; ^ ￿T) be the stream of equilibrium payments and pro￿ts that, given
the mechanism ^ ￿; correspond to the sequence of reports (^ ￿1;^ "T). For any (^ ￿1;^ "T) and given any
sequence of true shocks (￿1;"T), the agent￿ s payo⁄ in this ￿ctitious environment is given by
^ UA(￿1;"T;^ ￿1;^ "T) =
T X
t=1
￿t￿1[^ ct ￿  (^ et(￿1;"t;^ ￿1;^ "t))]




￿t￿1[^ ct ￿  (^ ￿t ￿ zt(￿1;"t) ￿ ￿
￿
^ ￿t￿1 ￿ zt￿1(￿1;"t￿1)
￿
)]




￿t￿1[^ ct ￿  (^ ￿t ￿ ￿t(￿1) ￿ ￿t("t) ￿ ￿(^ ￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1(￿1) ￿ ￿t￿1("t￿1)))]
The assumptions that   and ￿t are di⁄erentiable and equi-Lipschitz continuous imply that ^ UA
is equi-Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable in ￿1. Now suppose the mechanism ^ ￿ is incentive
compatible in the unrestricted setting where the agent is free to choose any e⁄ort he wants at
any point in time. It is then necessarily incentive compatible also in this ￿ctitious setting where,
for each (￿1;"T;^ ￿1;^ "T), e⁄ort is pinned down by (4). The result in the Lemma then follows from
Proposition 1 in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2009,b): Letting ^ UA(￿1;"T) denote the agent￿ s payo⁄
when he follows a truthtelling and obedient strategy, we have that ^ ￿ is incentive compatible only
16if V






















￿t￿1D1;t(￿1) 0(^ et(￿1;~ "t))
#
,
which establishes the result. ￿
Now, one can think of the principal￿ s problem as involving the choice of a pair of contingent
policies h^ ￿;^ ci so as to maximize her expected payo⁄






^ ￿t(~ ￿1;~ "t) ￿ ^ ct(~ ￿1;~ "t)
i
#
subject to all IC and IR constraints. Because both the principal￿ s and the agent￿ s preferences
are quasilinear, E[^ UP] can be rewritten as expected total surplus, net of the agent￿ s expected
(intertemporal) rent:










^ ￿(~ ￿1)]. (5)
Using the result in the previous Lemma, and integrating by parts, the agent￿ s expected (intertem-
poral) rent can in turn be written as
E[V
^ ￿(~ ￿1)] = V
^ ￿(￿1)+E
"













￿t￿1D1;t(~ ￿1) 0(^ et(~ ￿1;~ "t))
#
.
Finally, substituting (6) into (5), we have that

















zt(~ ￿1;~ "t) + ^ et(~ ￿1;~ "t) +
Pt￿1
￿=1 ￿￿^ et￿￿(~ ￿1;~ "t￿￿) ￿  (^ et(~ ￿1;~ "t))




17Next, consider a relaxed program for the principal that consists of choosing an e⁄ort policy ^ e
and a constant V
^ ￿(￿) ￿ 0 so as to maximize E[^ UP]: The solution to this relaxed program is given
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose that D1;t(￿1) ￿ 0 for any ￿1 2 ￿1 and any t. The (almost-unique) solution to
the principal￿ s relaxed program is then given by V
^ ￿(￿) = 0 along with the e⁄ort policy ^ e￿ in the
Proposition.
Proof of the Lemma. The result follows directly from pointwise maximization of (7). The
assumptions that   is a continuously di⁄erentiable function with  (e) = 0 for all e < 0;  00(e) > 0
and  000(e) ￿ 0 for all e 2 [0; ￿ e],  0(e) = K for all e > ￿ e, together with D1;t(￿1) ￿ 0 for all
￿1, imply that, for all t all (￿1;"t), the principal￿ s payo⁄ ^ UP is strictly increasing in et for all
et < ^ e￿
t(￿1); and strictly decreasing in et for all et > ^ e￿
t(￿1), where ^ e￿









=[￿(￿1)D1;t(￿1)] and by ^ e￿
t(￿1) = 0 otherwise. ￿
To prove the result in part 1, it then su¢ ces to show that, when the e⁄ort policy in (2) satis￿es
the single-crossing condition (3), it can be implemented by the linear scheme proposed in the
Proposition. That is, it su¢ ces to show that, under this scheme, (i) the agent ￿nds it optimal
to participate in period one, (ii) the agent ￿nds it optimal to report all his private information
truthfully and to obey the principal￿ s recommendations, and (iii) the lowest period-1 type￿ s expected
payo⁄ is equal to his outside option, i.e. V
^ ￿(￿) = 0. This is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Assume the e⁄ort policy ^ e￿ that solves the relaxed program (as implicitly given by (2))
satis￿es the single-crossing condition (3). Then the mechanism ^ ￿ = h^ ￿t; ^ stiT
t=1, where ^ ￿t and ^ st
are, respectively, the recommendation policy and the reward scheme described in the Proposition,
implements the e⁄ort policy ^ e￿. Furthermore, ^ ￿ induces any type ￿1 to participate and gives the
lowest period-1 type ￿1 an expected payo⁄ of zero.
Proof of the Lemma. Because neither ^ ￿t nor ^ st depend on "t; it is immediate that the agent
￿nds it optimal to report the shocks truthfully. Furthermore, conditional upon reporting ^ ￿1 in
period 1; it is also immediate that, at any period t ￿ 1, the agent ￿nds it optimal to follow the
18principal￿ s recommendation and choose e⁄ort ^ e￿
t(^ ￿1); irrespective of his true period-1 type ￿1, the
true shocks "t and the history of past performances ￿t￿1. To see this, note that at any period
t ￿ 1; and for any history (￿1;"t;^ ￿1;^ "t;￿t￿1;et￿1); the problem that the agent faces in period t is












￿￿~ e￿￿￿ + z￿(￿1;~ "￿)
!




The solution to this problem is given by the (non-contingent) e⁄ort policy implicitly de￿ned by
 0(e￿) = ￿￿(^ ￿1) +
T X
s=1






is the one speci￿ed in the Proposition, the e⁄ort policy that solves
these conditions is the policy ^ e￿ that solves the relaxed program.
It remains to show that each type ￿1 ￿nds it optimal to report truthfully and to participate,
and that type ￿1 expects a zero payo⁄ from the relationship. That each type ￿1 ￿nds it optimal
to participate is guaranteed by the fact that his expected payo⁄ (under a truthful and obedient








which is non-negative because D1;t(￿1) ￿ 0 and  0(e) ￿ 0: To see that each type ￿1 ￿nds it optimal













￿t￿1￿t(^ ￿1)[zt(￿1;~ "t) ￿ zt(^ ￿1;~ "t)]
#
.

















[￿1 ￿ ^ ￿1] ￿ 0.


























t(^ ￿1)) ￿ ￿￿ 0(^ e￿
t+1(^ ￿1))]
￿
=  0(^ e￿
1(￿1)) ￿  0(^ e￿




2(￿1)) ￿ ￿￿ 0(^ e￿
2(￿1))
+:::
= [ 0(^ e￿
1(￿1)) ￿ ￿￿ 0(^ e￿
2(￿1))] ￿ [ 0(^ e￿















t(￿1)[￿t(￿1) ￿ ￿t(^ ￿1)]:
The result then follows from Lemma 12 in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2009,a).
Lemma 4 Suppose that, for any t, either (a) ￿ = 0 and the function ￿(￿)D1;t(￿) is non-increasing,
or (b)  (e) = ke2=2 for all e 2 [0; ￿ e] and ￿(￿)[D1;t(￿) ￿ ￿￿D1;t+1(￿)] is non-increasing [if T is
￿nite, then ￿(￿)D1;T(￿) is non-increasing]. Then the e⁄ort policy ^ e￿ implicitly given by (2) satis￿es





t(￿1)[￿t(￿1) ￿ ￿t(^ ￿1)]
#
h
￿1 ￿ ^ ￿1
i
￿ 0
Proof of the lemma. We establish the result by showing that, under the assumptions in
the lemma, ￿t(￿1) is non-decreasing in ￿1, for each t ￿ 1. Consider ￿rst case (a). When ￿ = 0;
￿t(￿1) =  0(^ e￿
t(￿1)). It then su¢ ces to show that the e⁄ort policy ^ e￿
t(￿1) implicitly given by (2) is
non-decreasing. To see that this is indeed the case, it is enough to recognize that the dynamic virtual
surplus (as de￿ned in 7) has increasing di⁄erences in et and ￿￿(￿1)D1;t(￿1) and, by assumption,
￿(￿)D1;t(￿) is non-increasing.16
16The relevant terms of the dynamic virtual surplus are et +
PT￿t
s=1(￿￿)
set ￿ (et)￿￿(￿1)Dt(￿1) 
0(et). The result
then follows from monotone comparative statics analysis (see Topkis (1998) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994)).






































































where the inequality follows from the assumption that ￿(￿)[D1;t(￿) ￿ ￿￿D1;t+1(￿)] is non-increasing.
Likewise, when T is ￿nite, then
￿T(￿0
1) ￿ ￿T(￿00
1) =  0(^ e￿
T(￿0











where the inequality follows from the assumption that ￿(￿)D1;T(￿) is non-increasing. ￿
This completes the proof of the proposition.
Note that, because the agent is indi⁄erent over the way the constant term S(￿1) is distributed












plus a fraction ￿t(￿1) of the current pro￿ts ￿t, with S1(￿1) now de￿ned by





1(s))ds ￿ ￿1(￿1)^ ￿￿
1(￿1).
While the particular way the constant term S1(￿1) is distributed over time is clearly inconsequential
for incentives, certain choices may have the advantage of guaranteeing that, if the agent has the
option to leave the relationship at any point in time, he does not ￿nd it optimal to do so. To see

















guarantees participation in each period, at any truthful history.
We now turn to the properties of the optimal e⁄ort policy.17 Because D1;t ￿ 0 and  0 is convex,
the optimal e⁄ort policy involves downward distortions. These distortions in turn depend on inverse
hazard rate ￿(￿1) of the ￿rst-period distribution F1 and on the function D1;t, which captures the
e⁄ect of ￿1 on both ￿t and ￿t￿1, taking into account the persistent e⁄ect of e⁄ort. When the process
for ￿t satis￿es condition SFC, these distortions are independent of the realizations of the shocks "t
and of their distributions Gt. Whether ^ e￿
t(￿1) increases or decreases with t then depends entirely
on the dynamics of D1;t(￿1) as illustrated in the following examples, where the conditions of Part
2 of Proposition 2 are clearly satis￿ed.
Example 1 Suppose that T = 1 and that ￿t evolves according to an AR(1) process
￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + "t
for some ￿ 2 (0;1) with ￿ > ￿ ￿ 0. Then D1;t(￿1) = ￿t￿2 (￿ ￿ ￿) for all ￿1 2 ￿1. It follows that
^ e￿




t(￿1) = 1=[1 ￿ ￿￿] = eFB 8￿1.
Example 2 Assume that each ￿t is i.i.d., so that D1;t(￿1) = 0 for all t ￿ 2 and all ￿1. Then e⁄ort
is distorted only in the ￿rst period, i.e. ^ e￿
1(￿1) < eFB
1 and ^ e￿
t = eFB
t for all t ￿ 2:
Example 3 Suppose ￿t follows a random walk, i.e.
￿t = ￿t￿1 + "t
and that e⁄ort has only a contemporaneous e⁄ect on the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts (i.e. ￿ = 0). Then ^ e￿
t(￿1) is
constant over time and coincides with the static optimal e⁄ort.
17Conditions similar to (2) have been derived in a two-period model by Baron and Besanko (1984) and La⁄ont
and Tirole (1991). However these early work do not examine under what conditions (and under what contracts), the
e⁄ort policies that solve the principal￿ s relaxed program are implementable.
22The result in Example 1 is actually quite general; many ARIMA(k,q,m) processes have the
property that limt!1 D1;t = 0; where D1;t are nonnegative scalars decreasing in t that depend on
the parameters (k,q,m) of the ARIMA process.
Example 2 is the case considered by Edmans and Gabaix (2008) in their baseline model, where
it is also assumed that ￿ = 0. However, contrary to the case considered here, they assume that
contracting occurs before the agent learns his ￿rst-period type. As discussed above, together with
risk neutrality this implies that the sequence of e⁄ort decisions is always e¢ cient.
Finally, the random walk case of Example 3 is also a process that is sometimes considered in
the literature. In this case, because e⁄ort is constant over time, the optimal mechanism can be
implemented by o⁄ering in period one the same menu of linear contracts that the principal would
o⁄er in a static relationship, and then committing to using the contract selected in period one in
each subsequent period. Each linear contract (indexed by ￿1) has a ￿xed payment of
S(￿1) ￿  (^ e￿(￿1)) +
Z ￿1
￿1
 0(^ e￿(s))ds ￿ ￿(￿1)[￿1 + ^ e￿(￿1)]
together with a piece-rate ￿(￿1): These contracts are reminiscent of those derived in La⁄ont and
Tirole (1986) in a static regulatory setting. Contrary to the static case, the entire linear scheme
S(￿1)+￿(￿1)~ ￿t ￿ as opposed to the point S(￿1)+￿(￿1)[￿1+^ e￿(￿1)] ￿ is now used over time. This
is a direct consequence of the fact that the ￿rm￿ s performance ~ ￿t now changes stochastically over
time in response to the shocks ~ "t. Also note that while the optimal mechanism can be implemented
by using in each period the static optimal contract for period one, this does not mean that the
dynamic optimal mechanism coincides with a sequence of static optimal contracts, as in Baron and
Besanko (1984). Rather the opposite. In fact, because the agent￿ s type ￿t (and its distribution)
changes over time, the sequence of static optimal contracts entails a di⁄erent choice of e⁄ort for
each period. What the result then implies is that, despite the lack of stationarity, it is optimal for
the principal to commit to the same reward scheme (and to induce the same e⁄ort) as if the agent￿ s
type were constant over time.
Out of curiosity, also note that the optimal reward scheme (and the corresponding e⁄ort dy-
namics) when ￿t follows a random walk coincide with the one that the principal would o⁄er in an
23environment in which the shocks have only a transitory (as opposed to permanent) e⁄ect on the
￿rm￿ s performance. More generally, assuming E[~ "t] = 0 for all t > 1 and letting (at
s)s;t denote arbi-




s"s as when ￿t = ￿0
t￿1 +"t.
Seniority. While the examples above highlight interesting properties for the dynamics of
e⁄ort, they also have important implications for the dynamics of the optimal reward scheme. What
these examples have in common is the fact that the e⁄ect of the agent￿ s ￿rst-period type on his
future types declines over time (strictly in the ￿rst example). We ￿nd this property of ￿declining
correlation￿to be reasonable for many stochastic processes describing the evolution of the agent￿ s
productivity. As anticipated in the introduction, this property has implications for the dynamics
of the optimal reward scheme. In particular, it helps understand why it may be optimal to reward
managers with a longer tenure with a more high-powered incentive scheme, e.g. by giving them
more equity in the ￿rm. To illustrate, consider the case presented in Example 1 above, and note
that in this case
￿t(￿1) = 1 ￿ ￿(￿1)(￿ ￿ ￿)￿t￿2[ 00(^ e￿
t(￿1)) ￿ ￿￿￿ 00(^ e￿
t+1(￿1))]. (8)
This term, which captures the power of the incentive scheme, is typically increasing in t (it is easy
to see that this is the case, for example, when ￿ = 0￿ in which case ￿t(￿1) reduces to  0(^ e￿
t(￿1))￿ or
when   is quadratic).
Note that the reason why the power of the incentive scheme here increases over time is not
driven by variations of the manager￿ s preferences. It is merely a consequence of the fact that, when
he was hired, the manager possessed relevant private information about his ability to generate
pro￿ts for the ￿rm. In the case of an AR(1) process, the correlation between the manager￿ s initial
type and his future types declines over time. This implies that, to minimize the informational
rents that the ￿rms￿shareholders must leave to the manager, it is optimal to (downward) distort
the agent￿ s e⁄ort more when he is ￿young￿than when he is ￿old￿ . Because the manager￿ s e⁄ort
is increasing in the sensitivity ￿t of his reward scheme to the ￿rm￿ s performance ￿t; this in turn
implies that it is optimal to give the manager a more ￿high powered￿incentive scheme when he is
￿senior￿than when he is ￿young￿ .
24Clearly, as mentioned in the introduction, other explanations for seniority have been suggested
in the literature. Gibbons and Murphy (1991), for example, argue that career-concern incentives
decline over time and, by implication, managers with a higher tenure must be provided with stronger
￿explicit contracts￿ , i.e. with more high-powered incentive schemes. In their model, explicit incen-
tives are a substitute for career-concern incentives.18
Another explanation for the correlation between seniority and the power of the incentive scheme
may come from the fact that the disutility of e⁄ort may decline over time, most notably as the
result of learning by doing. While we ￿nd such explanations plausible in certain environments,
what our results indicate is that, even in the absence of any assumption of time-variant prefer-
ences/technologies/career concerns, seniority may arise quite naturally as the result of an optimal
intertemporal screening problem in settings in which the correlation between the manager initial
type/talent and his future ones declines over time. We believe this is a plausible assumption for
most environments of interest.
3 Fully-contingent e⁄ort policies
Consider now an environment in which the process for ￿t does not satisfy the SFC condition. When
this is the case, the optimal e⁄ort policy typically depends not only on ￿1 but also on the realization
of the shocks "t. In many cases of interest, the optimal mechanism can still be implemented by a
menu of linear contracts, but the agent must now be allowed to change the slope of these contracts
over time in response to the shocks. To illustrate, assume that ￿ = 0; so that e⁄ort has only a
transitory e⁄ect on the ￿rm￿ s performance, that T < +1,19 that the stochastic process governing
the evolution of ￿t is Markov so that each kernel Ft(￿j￿t￿1) depends on ￿t￿1 only through ￿t￿1.
Finally, assume that, for any t any ￿t￿1; Ft(￿j￿t￿1) is absolutely continuous and strictly increasing
over ￿t with density ft(￿tj￿t￿1) > 0 for all ￿t 2 (￿t;￿ ￿t), and that, for each t; there exists an
integrable function Bt : ￿t ! R[f￿1;+1g such that, for any ￿t 2 ￿t; @Ft(￿tj￿t￿1)=@￿t￿1 exists
and j@Ft(￿tj￿t￿1)=@￿t￿1j ￿ Bt(￿t):20
18For a detailed analysis of career concerns incentives, see Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999).
19The results in this section actually extend to T = +1 under mild additional conditions.
20Throughout, if ￿t￿1 = ￿t￿1, then @Ft(￿tj￿t￿1)=@￿t￿1 denotes the right derivative of Ft with respect to ￿t￿1:
25Following steps similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 2, it is easy to see that the
solution to the principal￿ s relaxed program is an e⁄ort policy ^ e￿ that is implicitly de￿ned by the
following conditions21
 0(^ e￿





where z ￿ hzt(￿)i, G ￿ hGt(￿)i is any independent shock representation for the process that corre-
sponds to the kernels F = hFt(￿j￿)i
T
t=1 :
Equivalently, this condition can be expressed in terms of the primitive representation F as
follows. Consider the mechanism ￿ where in each period the agent reports ￿t (as opposed to "t).
Following steps similar to those in the proof of Proposition 2 (see also Proposition 2 in Pavan,
Segal, and Toikka (2009,a)), one can show that, in any IC mechanism, after almost every truthful
history22 ht￿1; the value function V ￿ ￿
￿t￿1;￿t
￿








































t (￿￿) is an impulse-response function that captures the total e⁄ect of a variation of
￿t on the distribution of ￿￿ taking into account all e⁄ects on intermediate types (￿t+1;:::;￿￿￿1):
While condition (10) applies to any (di⁄erentiable) process, in the case of a Markov process, be-
cause each Im
l (￿m) is equal to zero for all l < m￿1 and depends on ￿m only through (￿m;￿m￿1); the
impulse response J￿
t (￿￿) reduces to a function of (￿t;:::;￿￿) only and can be written as J￿
t (￿t;￿t+1;:::;￿￿) =
21Again, this presumes that the RHS of (9) evaluated at e = 0 is positive, which is the case when  
00
+(0) is not too




22A truthful history ht￿1 is one that is reached by reporting ￿
t￿1 truthfully and following the principal￿ s e⁄ort
recommendations in each period s = 1;:::;t￿1. For simplicity, whenever there is no risk of confusion, we will denote











Applying condition (10) to t = 1, we then have that
V ￿ (￿1) = E












 0(et(s;~ ￿2;:::;~ ￿t))ds
#
+ V ￿(￿1).
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￿ 0 for each t all ￿t, which is the case under FOSD, the optimal e⁄ort policy























This condition is the analogue of (9) expressed in terms of the primitive representation (the
one where the agent reports ￿t as opposed to "t). From the same arguments as in the previous
section, it then follows that, if there exists a payment scheme s that implements the e⁄ort policy
e￿ and gives zero expected surplus to the lowest period-one type (i.e. such that V ￿(￿1) = 0) then,
together with the e⁄ort policy e￿; such a payment scheme is part of an optimal mechanism.
Now consider the following class of payment schemes. In each period t, the principal pays the
agent a ￿xed amount St(￿t) and a linear bonus ￿t(￿t)￿t; where both St and ￿t are now allowed to
depend on the entire history of reports ￿t (equivalently, St and ￿t are chosen by the agent out of
a menu, as a function of the observed shocks ￿t). In what follows, we show that when the desired
e⁄ort policy e￿ satis￿es a certain single-crossing condition, which is the analogue of condition (3)
in the previous section, then the policy e￿ can be implemented by a reward scheme in this class.
To see this, for any t; let
￿t(￿t) =  0(e￿
t(￿t)):
27The sequence of ￿xed payments St(￿t) is then de￿ned recursively as follows. For t = T; let







while for any t < T,








































where, for any j = 1;:::;T; any ￿j 2 ￿j; ￿￿
j(￿j) ￿ ￿j + e￿
j(￿j).
Now suppose t = T and that the history of past reports is ^ ￿
T￿1
: It is then immediate that,
irrespective of the true shocks ￿T, if the agent reports ^ ￿T in period T, he then ￿nds it optimal
to choose e⁄ort e￿
T(^ ￿
T￿1
;^ ￿T). Because the environment is Markov, it is also immediate that,
irrespective of whether the history of past reports ^ ￿
T￿1
was truthful, an agent whose period-T type
is ￿T always ￿nds it optimal to report truthfully in period T: This follows from arguments similar
to those used to establish Proposition 2. To see this, note that the continuation payo⁄ that type









;s))ds + ￿T(^ ￿
T￿1


















































[￿T ￿ ^ ￿T] ￿ 0 (14)
23In what follows, by continuation payo⁄, we mean the discounted sum of the future ￿ ow payo⁄s.
28if and only if e￿
T(^ ￿
T￿1
;￿) is increasing. As it is well known, condition (14) guarantees that
truthtelling is optimal (see, e.g. Garcia, 2005).
Now, by induction, suppose that, irrespective of whether he has reported truthfully in the past,
at any period ￿ > t, the agent ￿nds it optimal to report ￿￿ truthfully. Then, consider the agent￿ s
incentives in period t: Take any history of reports ^ ￿
t￿1
: Again, because the environment is Markov,
it is irrelevant whether this history corresponds to the truth or not. Then suppose the agent￿ s true
type in period t is ￿t and he announces ^ ￿t: His continuation payo⁄ is then given by
ut(￿t;^ ￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
) = ut(^ ￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
) + ￿t(^ ￿
t￿1





































is the equilibrium continuation payo⁄ under a truthful and obedient strategy starting from period
l onwards, given the current type ￿l and the history of past reports ^ ￿
l￿1















































;^ ￿t;~ ￿t+1 :::;~ ￿￿))
#
:
Once again, a su¢ cient condition for ut(￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
) ￿ ut(￿t;^ ￿t;^ ￿
t￿1












[￿t ￿ ^ ￿t] ￿ 0; (18)
or equivalently that
E











;￿t;~ ￿t+1 :::;~ ￿￿) ￿ ￿￿(^ ￿
t￿1
;^ ￿t;~ ￿t+1 :::;~ ￿￿)]
#
[￿t￿^ ￿t] ￿ 0:
(19)
24The expression in (17) is obtained by integration by parts, using (16).
29This condition is the equivalent of condition (3) in the previous section. Note that, this condition
is satis￿ed, for example, when the e⁄ort policy is strongly monotone, i.e. when at any period t;
e￿
t(￿t) is nondecreasing in ￿t: We then have the following result.
Proposition 3 Assume the evolution of ￿t is governed by a Markov process satisfying the assump-
tions described above and that, for each period t; ￿t = ￿t + et.
1. Any e⁄ort policy satisfying the single-crossing condition (19) for any t; any (^ ￿
t￿1
;^ ￿t;￿t), can
be implemented by the following linear pay package: In every period t; given any history of
reports ￿t and any history of observed performances ￿t, the principal pays the agent
st(￿t;￿t) = St(￿t) + ￿t(￿t)￿t,
where ￿t(￿t) ￿  0(et(￿t)) and where the ￿xed payment St(￿) is as in (11).
2. Let e￿ be the e⁄ort policy implicitly de￿ned, for all t and all ￿t 2 ￿t; by
 0(e￿






unless  00(0) ￿ 1=[￿(￿1)Jt




= 0: Assume e￿ satis￿es the single-
crossing condition of (19) for any t; any ^ ￿
t￿1
any ￿t. Then e￿, together with the linear pay
package s￿ described in part (1), are part of an optimal mechanism.
A few remarks are in order. First, note that the result in Proposition 3 complements that in
Proposition 2: while Proposition 3 does not restrict the process for ￿t to satisfy the SFC condition,
it restricts ￿t to follow a Markov process, a property that is not required by Proposition 2.
Second, note that the linear scheme in Proposition 3 has the appealing property of guaranteeing
that, even if the agent has the option of leaving the relationship at any point in time, he never ￿nds
it optimal to do so, i.e. it guarantees participation at any period, after any history.
Third note that a key distinction between the linear scheme of Proposition 3 and that of
Proposition 2 is that the agent is now allowed to propose changes to his pay package over time.
These changes are in response to the shocks ￿t: This ￿nding is consistent with some of the recent
30literature on managerial compensation which documents that CEO compensation is often proposed
by CEOs themselves (see e.g. Bebchuck and Fried, 2004). In our setting, the ￿rm￿ s shareholders
(the principal) set in advance broad restrictions on the CEO￿ s pay package but then delegate to
the latter the choice of the speci￿c terms of the reward scheme so as to permit him to respond to
(unveri￿able) variations in the environment. In particular, the optimal mechanism involves o⁄ering
the CEO a menu of linear contracts with memory, in the sense that the set of possible packages
available for period t depends on the reward packages selected in past periods (as indexed by ￿t￿1).
Fourth, note that a form of seniority is likely to hold also in this environment, albeit only in
expectation. For example, suppose   is quadratic. Then, by inspecting (20), one can see that the
power of the incentive scheme, as captured by et increases, on average, with the manager￿ s tenure,











. As discussed in the introduction, this property
is satis￿ed by many stochastic processes for which the dependence of the distribution of ￿t on ￿1
declines with t:
Lastly note that, while the possibility of implementing the policy e￿ that solves the relaxed
program (as given by (20)) with a menu of linear schemes is certainly appealing, such a possibility
cannot be taken for granted. In fact, in many cases of interest, e￿ does not satisfy the single-
crossing condition of (19). To see this, assume that, for any t > 1 and any ￿t￿1; It
t￿1 (￿;￿t￿1) is
continuous and lim￿t!￿t It
t￿1 (￿t;￿t￿1) = lim￿t!￿ ￿t It
t￿1 (￿t;￿t￿1) = 0:25 Then for any 1 < s ￿ ￿;
any ￿￿
￿s; lim￿s!￿s J￿
1 (￿1;:::;￿s;:::￿￿) = lim￿s!￿ ￿s J￿




















is then typically non-
monotone in ￿s, for any ￿ ￿ s any ￿￿
￿s; which makes it di¢ cult (if not impossible) to satisfy
(19).
Motivated by the aforementioned considerations about the possible di¢ culties of implementing
the optimal e⁄ort policy with linear schemes, we now consider an alternative implementation based
on the ￿trick￿used to establish Lemma 1 in the proof of Proposition 2. The idea is to charge the
agent a su¢ ciently large penalty L whenever, given the announcements ￿t, the observed pro￿ts
25Note that, under our assumption of full support (i.e. Ft strictly increasing) over ￿t; these conditions hold, for
example, when ￿ ￿t < +1 and when Ft is an atomless distribution with density strictly positive over [￿t;￿ ￿t]:
31are di⁄erent from the equilibrium ones ￿￿
t(￿t). To see how this permits one to relax condition
(19), suppose that in all periods t < T the principal uses the same reward scheme as in Part 1 in















Note that, conditional on ￿meeting the target￿ , under the new scheme, for any sequence of reports
￿T; the agent receives exactly the same compensation he would have obtained under the original
linear scheme by choosing e⁄ort in period t so as to attain pro￿ts ￿T(￿T). Provided that L is large
enough, it is then immediate that deviations from the equilibrium strategy are less pro￿table under
the new scheme than under the original linear one. In particular, the agent￿ s continuation payo⁄
in period T, after he has reported (^ ￿
T
) and experienced a shock ￿T in period t, is now given by






























;s))ds +  (e￿
T(^ ￿
T￿1
;^ ￿T)) ￿  (e￿
T(^ ￿
T￿1
;^ ￿T) + ^ ￿T ￿ ￿T)
rather than uT(￿T;^ ￿T;^ ￿
T￿1
) as in Equation (12). Irrespective of whether ^ ￿
T￿1
was truthful or not,
incentive compatibility is then ensured in period T (i.e., the agent ￿nds it optimal to report ￿T
truthfully and then choose the equilibrium level of e⁄ort e￿
T(^ ￿
T￿1
;￿T)) if the e⁄ort policy e￿ satis￿es






;￿T)) ￿  0(e￿
T(^ ￿
T￿1
;^ ￿T) + ^ ￿T ￿ ￿T)
ih
￿T ￿ ^ ￿T
i
￿ 0. (22)







;^ ￿T))][￿T ￿ ^ ￿T] ￿ 0: Moving from the linear scheme to this alternative scheme thus
permits one to implement e⁄ort policies that are not necessarily monotone in the shock ￿T. It is
easy to see that condition (22) is equivalent to requiring that the pro￿t function ￿T(^ ￿
T￿1
;￿) (as
opposed to the e⁄ort policy e￿
T(^ ￿
T￿1
;￿)) being non-decreasing. Absent the dependence on history,
this is the same result found by La⁄ont and Tirole (1993, A1.4) for the static case.
26As mentioned above, note that the payo⁄ under truthtelling under the new scheme is exactly the same as under
the original scheme. That is uT(￿T;^ ￿
T￿1
) continues to be as in (13).
32Now suppose the principal replaces the entire linear scheme s￿ with the incentive scheme s
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where ￿￿￿(￿￿) = (￿￿
s(￿s))￿
s=1 with ￿￿
s(￿s) ￿ ￿s +e￿
s(￿s); all s ￿ ￿: Note that, for t = T; this scheme
is the same as the one in (21). Now suppose, by induction, that under the scheme s de￿ned above,
truthful reporting is optimal for the agent in each period ￿ > t, irrespective of the period-￿ history
(recall that, because the environment is Markov, if truthful reporting is optimal on the equilibrium
path, i.e. at a truthful period-￿ history, then it is optimal at all period-￿ histories). Provided L is
large enough, the agent￿ s period-t continuation payo⁄ under this scheme when his period-t type is
￿t, he reports ^ ￿t, and the sequence of past reports is ^ ￿
t￿1
, is then given by
^ ut(￿t;^ ￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
) = ut(^ ￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
) +  (e￿
t(^ ￿
t￿1
;^ ￿t)) ￿  (e￿
t(^ ￿
t￿1


















) continues to denote the equilibrium
continuation payo⁄, as de￿ned in (16). Incentive compatibility is then guaranteed in period t if
condition (18) holds, that is, if
E








;￿t)) ￿  0(e￿
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;￿t;~ ￿t+1 :::;~ ￿￿)) ￿  0(e￿
￿(^ ￿
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5[￿t ￿ ^ ￿t] ￿ 0. (24)







replaced by  0(e￿
t(^ ￿
t￿1
;￿t)) ￿  0(e￿
t(^ ￿
t￿1
;^ ￿t) + ^ ￿t ￿ ￿t): We then have the following result.
Proposition 4 Any e⁄ort policy satisfying the single-crossing condition (24) for any t any (^ ￿
t￿1
;^ ￿t;￿t),
can be implemented by the non-linear pay scheme given in (23).
As an illustration of how the scheme s given in (23) may help implementing e⁄ort policies e￿
that solve the principal￿ s relaxed program but that cannot be implemented with the linear scheme
s￿ of Proposition 3, consider the following example.
33Example 4 Suppose that, for any e 2 [0; ￿ e];   (e) = e2=2. Let ￿1 be a non-negative random variable
with distribution F strictly increasing and absolutely continuous on the interval [￿1;￿ ￿1] ￿ R++ with
hazard rate ￿(￿1) nonincreasing and such that ￿ (￿1) ￿ ￿1 for each ￿1.27 Now suppose that, for
any t ￿ 2, ￿t = ￿1 ￿ ￿t
￿=2"￿, where ~ "T ￿ (~ "￿)T
￿=2 is a collection of jointly independent random
variables, each independent of ￿1, each distributed according to the function G strictly increasing
and absolutely continuous with density g strictly positive over R+. Let e￿ be the e⁄ort policy that
solves the relaxed program as given in (20). Then the policy e￿ cannot be implemented by the linear
scheme of Proposition 3 but it can be implemented by the non-linear scheme of Proposition 4.
4 Risk aversion
We now show how the optimal mechanism must be adjusted to accommodate the possibility that
the agent is risk averse. We restrict attention here to the case where T is ￿nite. To simplify the
notation, we omit discounting, i.e. set ￿ = 1. We start by assuming that the agent￿ s preferences











where V is a strictly increasing and (weakly) concave function. This representation is quite common
in the literature (e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom￿ s (1987) seminal paper on linearity and aggrega-
tion in dynamic contracting). As is well known, this representation permits one to introduce risk
aversion while at the same time avoiding any complication stemming from the desire of consump-
tion smoothing: it is thus appropriate for a setting where the agent cares only about his total
compensation and not the way this is distributed over time. We will come back to an alternative
representation that accommodates preferences for consumption smoothing at the end of the section.
For the stochastic process for ￿t, we adopt a general independent-shock representation and
assume each zt(￿1;"t) is di⁄erentiable and equi-Lipschitz continuous.
Since the agent￿ s productivity a⁄ects neither the marginal contribution of e⁄ort to pro￿ts, nor
the agent￿ s disutility from it, and since the agent￿ s preferences over money are also separable from
27This condition is satis￿ed, for instance, when ￿1 is distributed uniformly over the interval [1;3=2]:
34the agent￿ s productivity, the ￿rst-best solution to the principal￿ s problem is constant both over
productivities and time. It is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume, as in Proposition 1, that the agent does not possess private information.
The optimal contract for the principal implements the e⁄ort policy given by ^ et = ^ eFB for all t,









Proposition 5 shows that the ￿rst-best e⁄ort now depends on the agent￿ s marginal utility of




that just compensataes him for
his total disutility of e⁄ort. This foreshadows one of the new roles for information rents that
we explore below ￿further payments to cover the agent￿ s information rents when the agent has
private information will lower the agent￿ s marginal utility of money, making incentives for e⁄ort
more costly.
To examine the e⁄ects of information rents, one can follow steps similar to those used to establish
Proposition 2. The characterization of incentive compatibility is una⁄ected by the introduction of
risk aversion and that the agent￿ s value function in period one remains equal to
V
^ ￿(￿1) = V






D1;t(s;~ "t) 0(^ et(s;~ "t))ds
#
;







with z1(￿1) ￿ ￿1. Note that these D1;t(￿1;"t) functions reduce to the corresponding D1;t(￿1)
functions of Section 2.2 when the stochastic process for ￿t satis￿es the SFC condition.
A similar characterization applies to each period t > 1. For example, incentive compatibility
at any truthful history28 hT￿1 = (￿1;"T￿1) implies that V
^ ￿(￿1;"T￿1;"T) is Lipschitz continuous in
28Note that incentive compatibility at a truthful history ht means that the agent￿ s value function in the meachanim
^ ￿ after reaching history ht is equal to the agent￿ s expected payo⁄ when, starting from history ht the agent follows a
truthful and obedient strategy in each period ￿ ￿ t: Also recall that incentive-compatibility in period one, given ￿1,
implies incentive compatibility at almost all (i.e. with probability one) truthful period t-history, t = 1;:::;T:








which in turn implies that
V
^ ￿(￿1;"T￿1;"T) = V






Furthermore, using the fact that incentive compatibility implies that V
^ ￿(￿1;"T￿1;"T) must coincide





















that the agent assigns
to the total payment
PT
t=1 ^ ct(￿1;"t) is uniquely determined by the e⁄ort policy ^ e up to a constant
V
^ ￿(￿1;"T￿1;"T) which may depend on (￿1;"T￿1) but is independent of "T. Iterating backwards,
and noting that for each period t and any history ht
V
^ ￿(ht) = E[V
^ ￿(ht;~ "t+1)];
the dependence of the constant V
^ ￿(￿1;"T￿1;"T) on the history (￿1;"T￿1) also turns out to be
uniquely determined by the e⁄ort policy ^ e up to a scalar K that does not depend on anything.29







for any s > t, these arguments lead to Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 In any incentive-compatible mechanism ^ ￿, the total payment to the agent in each
state (￿1;"T) is given by:
T X
t=1
^ ct(￿1;"t) = V￿1
  PT
t=1  (^ et(￿1;"t)) + V



















































Using the characterization in Proposition 6, we then have that, in any incentive-compatible
mechanism, the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ can be expressed as:






















































The expression in (26) is the analogue of dynamic virtual surplus for the case of a risk-averse
agent (it is easy to see that, when V is the identity function and the process for ￿t satis￿es the SFC
condition, (26) reduces to the same expression as in (7) by standard integration by parts).
We now turn to the possibility of using ￿quasi-linear￿schemes (i.e. pay packages that are convex
in a linear aggregator of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts) to implement a desired e⁄ort policy. We start with the
following result.
Proposition 7 Let ^ e be any policy that depends only on time t and on the agent￿ s ￿rst-period type





ED1;t(￿1;~ "t)[￿t(￿1) ￿ ￿t(^ ￿1)]
#
[￿1 ￿ ^ ￿1] ￿ 0 (27)
for any ￿1;^ ￿1 2 ￿1, where for any t < T and any ￿1,
￿t(￿1) ￿  0(^ e￿
t(￿1)) ￿ ￿ 0(^ e￿
t+1(￿1)),
while for t = T; ￿T(￿1) ￿  0(^ e￿
T(￿1)). Then the e⁄ort policy ^ e can be implemented by a ￿quasi-
linear￿payment scheme ^ s￿ according to which the total payment the agent receives when he reports




























with ^ ￿t(￿1;"t) ￿ zt(￿1;"t) + ^ et(￿1) +
Pt￿1
￿=1 ￿￿^ et￿￿(￿1):
The proof follows from steps similar to those that establish Proposition 2, adjusted for the fact
that the stochastic process for ￿t is here not restricted to satisfy the SFC condition and for the fact
that the agent￿ s payo⁄ is now allowed to be concave in his total reward.
The value of the proposition is twofold. Firstly, it guarantees a form of continuity in the optimal
mechanism and in the players￿payo⁄with respect to the agent￿ s preferences. In particular, it implies
that when V is su¢ ciently close to the identity function, the principal can guarantee herself a payo⁄
arbitrarily close to the one she obtains under risk neutrality by choosing to implement the same
e⁄ort policy as in Proposition 2 and by adjusting the reward scheme as indicated in (28). More
generally, the proposition shows how one can adjust the linear reward scheme identi￿ed in the
baseline model to implement any e⁄ort policy that depends only on time t and the agent￿ s ￿rst
period report ￿1, provided that such a policy satis￿es the single-crossing condition of (27).
We now turn to the characterization of the optimal e⁄ort policy. We start by considering
policies that depend only on ￿1, and then turn to general policies. To facilitate the characterization
of the necessary conditions, we consider an example in which ￿t follows an ARIMA process (in
which case the Dt;s functions are scalars) and where the inverse of the agent￿ s utility function over
consumption is quadratic.
Example 5 Suppose that T < 1 and that ￿ = 0 so that ￿t = ￿t + et, t = 1;:::;T: In addition,
suppose that the process governing the evolution of ￿t is ARIMA. Suppose, further, that for any
t ￿ 2,




38with D￿;t ￿ 0, for any ￿;t. Suppose also that ￿1 is distributed according to the c.d.f. F1, strictly
increasing on an interval ￿1 = [￿1;￿ ￿1] ￿ R, and each "t distributed according to the c.d.f. Gt,
strictly increasing on a compact interval Et ￿ R: Let the agent￿ s utility function over consumption
be given by V(c) = 1
￿
p
2￿c + ￿2 ￿
￿
￿ with ￿;￿ > 0 and note that this function is chosen so that
V￿1 (u) = ￿
2u2 + ￿u. Let K > 1=￿ and assume that, in addition to the assumptions stated above,
the function   is such that log 0 is strictly concave on (0; ￿ e), and that for any e ￿ ￿ e,  (e) =
  (￿ e) + (e ￿ ￿ e)K. There exists an essentially unique30 policy ^ e￿ that maximizes the principal￿ s
expected payo⁄ (as given in 26) among those that depend on ￿1 only. This policy satis￿es, for any
























































with the inequality holding as equality if ^ e￿
t (￿1) > 0. When this policy satis￿es the single-crossing
condition (27), it can be implemented by the ￿quasi-linear￿payment scheme of Proposition 7.
To shed light on what lies behind Condition (29), recall that the choice of the optimal e⁄ort
policy trades o⁄ two concerns: (1) limiting the agent￿ s intertemporal informational rent (as per-
ceived from a period-1 perspective) and (2) insuring the agent against the risk associated with
variations in his reward that are necessary to guarantee incentive-compatibility. To see this more












































Because ￿1 is known at the time of contracting, the agent does not face any risk concerning his
period-one performance and hence the optimal choice of e⁄ort for period one is determined uniquely
30The quali￿er ￿essentially￿is due to the fact that the optimal policy is determined only almost everywhere.
39by the desire to limit the agent￿ s informational rent. It is easy to see that Condition (30) reduces
to Condition (2) for the risk-neutral case when ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1. Note that, as in the risk-neutral
case, the policy ^ e￿
1 is increasing in ￿1. This simply follows from the fact that the (measure of the)
set of types (￿1;￿ ￿1) to whom the principal must give a higher rent when he increases e1 (￿1) is
decreasing in ￿1: However, contrary to the risk-neutral case, distortions do not vanish ￿at the top￿ .

















































The reason is that, with risk aversion, the rent the principal must pay to type ￿ ￿1 to discourage him
from mimicking a lower type reduces ￿ ￿1￿ s marginal utility of money; this in turn makes higher e⁄ort
more costly to sustain which explains why the principal ￿nds it optimal to distort (downwards)
￿ ￿1￿ s e⁄ort (see also Battaglini and Coate, 2008, for a similar result in a two-type model).
Next, consider the optimal e⁄ort policy for t = 2: When applied to t = 2; Condition (29)












































2 (￿1)) 00(^ e￿
2 (￿1))V ar("2).
The key di⁄erence between (32) and (30) is the last term on the right-hand side of the equality.
This term captures the principal￿ s concern about exposing the agent to the risk associated with the
uncertainty the latter faces about his second period￿ s productivity. Other things equal, this term
contributes to reducing e⁄ort, as anticipated in the introduction.
To further appreciate the distinctions/similarities between the risk-neutral and the risk-averse
case, take the speci￿cation of the example, and suppose that ￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + "t, ￿ 2 (0;1], with
40Figure 1: Optimal (shock-independent) e⁄ort policies: AR1
￿1 uniformly distributed over [0;1]. In addition, assume that ￿ = 1, and that   (e) = e2
4 for all
e 2 (0; ￿ e); with ￿ e > 4 and K = ￿ e
2. Then note that, under risk-neutrality (￿ = 0; ￿ = 1), the
(fully)31 optimal policies are given by ^ e￿
1 (￿1) = 2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1) and ^ e￿
2 (￿1) = 2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)￿, with
eFB
1 = eFB
2 = 2: As discussed in Section 2.2, to minimize the agent￿ s informational rents, the
principal ￿nds it optimal to distort both e1 and e2 downward. Furthermore, because the e⁄ect of
the agent￿ s initial type on the distribution of his future types declines over time, it is optimal to
distort more in the early stages of the relationship than in the later ones. This property leads to the
seniority e⁄ect discussed in the previous sections. This e⁄ect can be seen easily within the context
of this example: the smaller ￿ is (i.e. the smaller the e⁄ect of ￿1 on ￿2) the stronger the seniority
e⁄ect, with ^ e￿
2 (￿1) = ^ e￿
1 (￿1) [i.e. no seniority] when ￿ = 1 [random walk case] and ^ e￿
2 (￿1) = ^ eFB
when ￿ = 0 [￿1 and ￿2 independent].
Now, to see how risk aversion a⁄ects the choice of e⁄ort, Figure 1 depicts the optimal (shock-
independent) policies for the aforementioned speci￿cation with ￿ = ￿ = 1; ￿ = 1
2, and "2 uniformly
distributed over [0;1]:32
While a form of seniority continues to hold (^ e￿
2 is on average higher than ^ e￿
1), risk aver-
sion tends to depress ^ e￿
2, thus reducing the optimality of seniority-based reward schemes. Fur-
31Recall, from Proposition 2, that with risk-neutrality restricting the policy ^ e to depend only on ￿1 is without loss
of optimality.
32We approximated the solution using a sixth-order polynomial.
41thermore, now there exist values of ￿1 for which ^ e￿
2 (￿1) < ^ e￿
1 (￿1): To see the reason for this,











V ar("2). As discussed above, this term captures the additional cost
associated with a high second-period e⁄ort, stemming from the volatility of the agent￿ s payment
generated by the shock "2 to his second-period productivity. To better appreciate where this term
comes from, recall, from Proposition 6, that incentive-compatibility requires that the total payment














It is then immediate that reducing ^ e2(￿1) permits the principal to reduce the agent￿ s exposure to
the risk generated by "2: For high values of ￿1, this new e⁄ect dominates the rent-extraction e⁄ect
documented in the previous section, thus resulting in ^ e2 (￿1) < ^ e1 (￿1).
When the e⁄ect of ￿1 on ￿2 is small (i.e., for low values of ￿), this new e⁄ect mitigates but does
not overturn the optimality of seniority-based incentive schemes. When instead the e⁄ect of ￿1 on
￿2 is strong (i.e., for high values of ￿) then this new e⁄ect can completely reverse the optimality of
incentive schemes whose power increases with time. In the limit, when the shocks to the agent￿ s
productivity become fully persistent (￿t follows a random walk, i.e. ￿ = 1), one can then easily see
from (30) and (32) that ^ e2 (￿1) < ^ e1 (￿1) for all ￿1.
The aforemtioned properties extend to T > 2: Figure 2 depicts the optimal policies for the same
speci￿cation considered above but now letting T = 3: The left-hand side is for the case ￿ = 1=2 ,
while the right-hand side is for the case ￿ = 1 (random walk).
When ￿ = 1, e⁄ort decreases over time, for all ￿1. As anticipated in the introduction, this re￿ ects
the fact that reducing e⁄ort in period t is more e⁄ective in reducing the agent￿ s exposure to risk
than reducing e⁄ort in period s < t. When instead ￿ = 1=2 then, on average, e⁄ort is higher in the
early periods than in later ones, but, the opposite is true for high values of ￿1, as in the T = 2 case.
Furthermore, e⁄ort in later periods can now be decreasing in ￿1. This follows from the fact that,
when t is high, reducing the agent￿ s e⁄ort in period t has little e⁄ect on the agent￿ s informational
42Figure 2: Optimal (shock-independent) e⁄ort policies: AR1 and random walk
rent and a strong e⁄ect on the agent￿ s exposure to risk (while the opposite is true when t is small).
Now, distorting e⁄ort in any period t to reduce the agent￿ s rent is always relatively more e⁄ective
for low types than for high ones (the reason is the same as in static settings): this explains why the
optimal e⁄ort policy is increasing in ￿1 in the early stages of the relationship. Together with the
fact that a reduction in e⁄ort in period s is an (imperfect) substitute for a reduction of e⁄ort in
period t > s on the agent￿ s total exposure to risk, this implies that the optimal e⁄ort policy must
eventually become decreasing for t su¢ ciently large.
Another way the principal could mitigate the e⁄ect of the volatility of the shocks to the agent￿ s
productivity is by conditioning the e⁄ort policy on the realization of these shocks. To gauge the
e⁄ect of this additional ￿ exibility, consider again the same speci￿cation assumed above. While a
complete analytical characterization of the fully-optimal policy escapes us because of the complexity
of the optimization problem, we could approximate the optimal policy with 6th-degree polynomials.
The result for the T = 2 is depicted in Figure 3, where we considered the same parametrization as
43Figure 3: Fully optimal ￿rst-period and average second-period e⁄ort policies
in Figure 1, but now allowed the second-period e⁄ort to depend on the shock "2. Again, when the
correlation between ￿1 and ￿2 is not too high (in the example, ￿ = 1=2), the optimality of seniority-
based schemes is maintained: E^ e2 (￿1;~ "2) is on average higher than ^ e1 (￿1); with the inequality
reversed for su¢ ciently high values of ￿1.
Also note that the second-period e⁄ort is typically decreasing in the shock "2, as illustrated in
Figure 4. This negative correlation permits the principal to further reduce the agent￿ s exposure to
risk, as one can see directly from (33).
The negative correlation between ^ e￿
2 and "2 also suggests that, in certain environments such
as the one considered in this example, it may be di¢ cult to sustain the fully-optimal policy with
linear or even ￿quasi-linear￿schemes such as those of Proposition 7. When this is the case, one
may need to resort to the type of schemes introduced in Proposition 4, adapted to the presence of
risk aversion as indicated in Proposition 8 below. To facilitate the comparison with the results in
the previous section, we revert here to the primitive representation where the agent reports ￿t, as
opposed to the shocks "t. The following proposition then generalizes the results in Propositions 3
and 4 to the case of a (weakly) risk averse agent.
Proposition 8 Suppose the agent￿ s type ￿t evolves according to a Markov process and that e⁄ort
44Figure 4: Fully-optimal second-period e⁄ort
has only a transitory e⁄ect on performance, so that ￿t = ￿t + et, all t.
1. Any policy e satisfying the single-crossing condition of (19) for any t; any (^ ￿
t￿1
;^ ￿t;￿t); can
be implemented by the following ￿quasi-linear￿scheme: given the reports ￿T and the observed












where the functions St(￿) are as in (11) and where ￿t(￿t) ￿  0(et(￿t)):
2. Any e⁄ort policy e satisfying the single-crossing condition (24) for any t; any (^ ￿
t￿1
;^ ￿t;￿t),
can be implemented by the following ￿bonus￿scheme: given the reports ￿T and the observed





























if ￿t ￿ ￿￿
t(￿t) ￿ ￿t + et(￿t) 8 t; and
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45Depending on whether the desired e⁄ort policy satis￿es the stronger single-crossing condition of
(24) or the weaker single-crossing condition of (19), it can be implemented either by the quasi-linear
scheme of part (1) where the agent￿ s compensation is a convex function of the linear aggregator
PT
t=1[St(￿t) + ￿t(￿t)￿t], or by the bonus scheme of part (2) according to which the agent receives
a positive bonus only upon meeting the ￿rm￿ s targets in each period.





















































= 0. Since the most the agent could obtain
was by reporting truthfully and following e⁄ort recommendations under the quasi-linear scheme, it
must also be the case under the linear scheme. Note, however, that an e⁄ort policy implemented
by the linear scheme need not be implementable by the quasi-linear scheme.
4.1 Consumption smoothing
Finally, to see how the results in the previous sections may be a⁄ected by the agent￿ s preferences




￿t￿1[v(ct) ￿  (et)].
For simplicity, assume here that e⁄ort has only a transitory e⁄ect on the ￿rm￿ s performance,
i.e. ￿t = ￿t + et for all t, and that ￿t evolves according to a Markov process as in the previous
section. Following the same steps used to establish Proposition 6, one can show that, in each state
￿T ￿equivalently, (￿1;"T) ￿the utility of the total payment to the agent is uniquely pinned down
by the policy e up to a constant V ￿(￿1). The characterization of the optimal reward scheme in this




























































Then let copt(￿;e) denote the reward scheme that minimizes the expected payment to the principal,
among all schemes that satisfy conditions (34), naturally adapted to the ￿ltration generated by the
history of reports ￿t: We then have the following result.
Proposition 9 Suppose the agent￿ s type ￿t evolves according to a Markov process and that e⁄ort

















1. For any t any ￿t; let ￿t(￿t) ￿  0(e￿
t(￿t)). Suppose the policy e￿ satis￿es the single-crossing
condition of (19) for any t any (^ ￿
t￿1
;^ ￿t;￿t). Then e￿ together with the ￿quasi-linear￿reward
scheme s￿ de￿ned below are part of an optimal mechanism. The scheme s￿ is such that, in
each period t; given the reports ￿t and the observed performances ￿t, the principal pays the
agent a reward s￿
t(￿t;￿t) = v￿1 ￿
S￿
t (￿t) + ￿t(￿t)￿t
￿
, where the ￿xed payment S￿











t(￿t) ￿ ￿t + e￿
t(￿t) for any t any ￿t:
2. Suppose instead that the policy e￿ does not satisfy the single-crossing condition of (19) but
satis￿es the single-crossing condition of (24) for any t; any (^ ￿
t￿1
;^ ￿t;￿t). Then e￿ can be
47implemented by the following ￿bonus￿scheme s￿: in each period t; given the reports ￿t and





t(￿t) and charges the agent a penalty L > 0 otherwise.
Both parts (1) and (2) follow directly from the preceding results along with the de￿nition of
copt(￿;e). The only di⁄erence between this environment and the one examined at the beginning
of this section is that, while in that setting the way the total payment is distributed over time
is irrelevant for the agent (and hence for the principal), in the environment considered here it is
essential to distribute the payments optimally over the entire relationship. The payment schemes in
Proposition 9 guarantee that the agent has the right incentives to report his information truthfully
and then exert the right level of e⁄ort, while at the same time inducing the level of intertemporal
consumption smoothing that maximizes the agent￿ s utility and hence minimizes the cost for the
principal.
To get a sense of how the principal allocates optimally the agent￿ s consumption over time (which
is instrumental to the characterization of the optimal e⁄ort policy) one can use Rogerson￿ s (1985)
necessary conditions for optimality. Adapted to our environment, these conditions can be stated
as follows.
Proposition 10 Suppose that the e⁄ort policy e can be implemented by the reward scheme s and
let c be the corresponding consumption policy. If s implements e at minimum cost for the principal,

















We now show how one can calculate the optimal e⁄ort policies. The payo⁄equivalence result of
condition (34) permits one to determine the total utility of consumption (up to a constant V ￿(￿1))
that must be given to the agent in each state ￿T, for any given e⁄ort policy e. However, because
the agent￿ s payo⁄ now depends on the timing of the payments, the principal must now span the
payments optimally over time, adding an additional dimension to the problem. One way to arrive
48to the optimal policy e￿ is the one indicated in Proposition 9; using (34) and (35) one determines
the optimal payment scheme for each possible e⁄ort policy e and then chooses the policy e￿ that
maximizes the principal￿ s expected payo⁄. An alternative route, described below, involves using the
utility of consumption as an additional control and then maximizing the principal￿ s expected payo⁄
with respect to e⁄ort and utility of consumption, subject to (34). This alternative approach often
facilitates the computation, for it does not require computation of the cost-minimizing payment
scheme for each possible e⁄ort policy e:
To illustrate, suppose for simplicity that T = 2 and ￿ = 1. Denote the utility of consumption
in each period by u1 (￿1) = v (c1 (￿1)) and u2 (￿1;￿2) = v (c2 (￿1;￿2)). Then, for any ￿T = (￿1;￿2),
equation (34), evaluated at both (￿1;￿2) and (￿1;￿2), allows us to express each u1 (￿1) and u2 (￿1;￿2)
as functions of the e⁄ort policy, the constant V ￿(￿1), and the function u2 (￿;￿2). Speci￿cally, for all
(￿1;￿2),






















 0 (e2 (￿1;s))ds.
The optimal mechanism can then be obtained by maximizing the principal￿ s expected payo⁄
E(~ ￿1;~ ￿2)
h





















with respect to e1 (￿), e2 (￿;￿), u2 (￿;￿2), and the constant V ￿(￿1), where u1 and u2 are given by (36)
and (37).
As in previous problems, at any optimum, V ￿(￿1) = 0: As an illustration, consider the same
speci￿cation as in Example 5, i.e. let v(c) = 1
￿
p
2￿c + ￿2 ￿
￿
￿ for ￿;￿ > 0, and assume that
49J2
1(￿1;￿2) = 1
2 (an equivalent choice was made for Figures 3 and 4 in the previous subsection).
Using again sixth-order polynomials, we can then compute numerically the optimal e⁄ort policies.







are increasing in ￿1, and e2 (￿1;￿2) is decreasing in ￿2 (because of the similarity,
the ￿gures for the present case are not displayed).
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Because the agent￿ s participation constraint clearly binds at the
optimum, the principal￿ s payo⁄ coincides with the total surplus generated by the relationship,












￿t + et +
t￿1 X
￿=1
￿￿et￿￿ ￿  (et)
#
The result then follows from pointwise maximization of E[W] with respect to each et(￿1;"t):
Proof of Example 4. First note that this environment satis￿es all the conditions on the kernels
F assumed at the beginning of the section and that, for any t ￿ 2; any ￿t 2 ￿t = R+; any ￿t￿1;















































is decreasing in ￿t, it violates condition (19). Further-
more, by taking e.g. t = T, one can easily see that, for any ^ ￿1 and any ^ ￿T < ￿T < ^ ￿1=￿(^ ￿1),
uT(￿T;^ ￿T;^ ￿
T￿1
) > uT(￿T;^ ￿
T￿1










































)ds + ￿T(^ ￿
T￿1

















[￿T ￿ ^ ￿T]
are, respectively, the continuation payo⁄ that type ￿T obtains by reporting ￿T truthfully and the
continuation payo⁄ he obtains by reporting ^ ￿T < ￿T; under the linear scheme s￿ of Proposition 3.
This proves that e￿ cannot be implemented with the linear scheme.
Finally, to see that e￿ can be implemented by the scheme s of Proposition 4, it su¢ ces to show
that the single-crossing condition (24) holds for any t; any (^ ￿
t￿1
;^ ￿t;￿t): To see this, note that, when
t = 1; (24) is equivalent to
E~ ￿2;:::;~ ￿T j￿1
2
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5[￿1 ￿ ^ ￿1] ￿ 0.























+ ^ ￿1 ￿ ￿1;0
)#
[￿t ￿ ^ ￿t] ￿ 0




￿ ^ ￿1 for each ^ ￿1.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let W ￿ V￿1. The principal maximizes, by choice of functions
(^ et (￿))
T













































It is immediate by the concavity of V and the convexity of   that the (almost-unique) solution to





t=1  (^ et)
￿
and asking in each period the agent to exert a level of e⁄ort ^ et implicitly de￿ned
by
W0 (T  (^ e￿)) 0 (^ et) = 1,
Using the inverse-function theorem then gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 6. We prove the result by backward induction, starting from t = T.
Using the characterization of the necessary conditions for incentive compatibility in the main text,


























































































































































































This establishes the ￿rst step of the induction. Now suppose that there exists a t ￿ T ￿ 1 such


































































































































































































































which proves that the representation in (38) holds also for s = t￿1. The result then follows directly
from the fact that the agent￿ s payo⁄under truthtelling must coincide with the value function almost
surely.
Proof of Example 5. Using (26), the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ in any incentive-compatible
mechanism ^ ￿ implementing a policy ^ e that is contingent on ￿1 only (i.e. such that there exists a
54sequence of functions ^ et : ￿1 ! R, t = 2;:::;T, such that ^ et(￿1;"t) = ^ et(￿1) for all "t) is given by

































s=1 D1;s 0 (^ es (z))dz +
PT































where, for s = 2;:::;T,
^ Hs (￿1;"s) = ["s ￿ E[~ "s]]
T X
￿=s
Ds;￿ 0 (^ e￿ (￿1)).
For each s = 2;:::;T, let ￿2


















































D1;s 0 (^ es (z))dz
!
:
The principal￿ s relaxed program then consists of choosing a vector of e⁄ort functions ^ et : ￿1 ! R;
t = 1;:::;T, along with a scalar V
^ ￿(￿1) ￿ 0, so as to maximize E[W(~ ￿1)]: It is immediate that,
at the optimum, V
^ ￿(￿1) = 0: Furthermore, given that  0(￿ e) > 1=￿; it is also immediate that any
policy ^ e = (^ et(￿))T
t=1 that maximizes E[W(~ ￿1)] must have the property that, for any t; ^ et(￿1) 2 [0; ￿ e]
for almost every ￿1 2 ￿1:
Now let g : [0;K]! R be the function de￿ned by g(0) = 0, g(y) =  0￿1(y); all y 2 (0;K);
and g(K) = ￿ e. For any t = 1;:::;T, any ￿1 2 ￿1, then let ut(￿1) ￿  0 (^ et(￿1)) and xt (￿1) ￿
R ￿1
￿1 ut (z)dz. Omitting the ￿rst term, which does not depend on the e⁄ort policy, the principal￿ s






where, for any (￿1;u;x) 2 ￿1 ￿ [0;K]T ￿ RT
+;






































ut(z)dz; 8t = 1;:::;T; 8￿1 2 ￿1. (40)
We solve this problem with optimal control treating u as the vector of control variables and x as
the vector of state variables. First we verify that a solution to this optimal control problem exists by
applying the Tonelli existence theorem.33 To this aim, we ￿rst show that, for any (￿1;x) 2 ￿1￿RT
+;






 00 (g (y))
￿
=
￿ 000 (g (y))
[ 00 (g (y))]3 < 0.
This implies that
PT
s=1 g (us) is strictly concave in u. Next, note that, for any y 2 (0;K);
d2




 0 (g (y))




 00 (g (y))
where h(z) ￿
 0(z)












> 0, since log 0 is concave.
Hence  (g (y)) is convex. Therefore,
T P
s=1
 (g (us)) is convex in u. Moreover, since (￿)
2 is convex and






















is weakly concave. Together these observations imply that L
is strictly concave in u, as required. Moreover, L is continuous.34 Finally, that u is bounded renders
33See, for example, Theorem 3.7 of Buttazzo, Giaquinta and Hildebrandt (1998).
34All that is required for a Tonelli-type existence theorem is that L be measurable in ￿1 for all admissible x and
u 2 [0;K]
T, and continuous in (x;u) for almost every ￿1. See Theorem 3.6 of Buttazzo, Giaquinta and Hildebrandt
(1998).
56the ￿coercivity￿condition of Tonelli￿ s theorem unnecessary.35 Thus a solution exists. Finally, that
L is weakly jointly concave in (u;x) and strictly concave in u implies that the solution is essentially
unique.
By Proposition 2.1 of Clarke (1989), that u is bounded and that L is strictly concave in u
for each x; then guarantees that each xt (￿) is continuously di⁄erentiable and that the Pontryagin
principle applies.
The Hamiltonian function is given by
H = L(￿1;u(￿1);x(￿1)) + ￿(￿1)>u(￿1).
where ￿ is the vector of co-state variables associated with the law of motions given by
_ x(￿1) = u(￿1) a.e. ￿1: (41)





























5+￿t (￿1) ￿ 0,
(42)
with inequality satis￿ed as equality if ut(￿1) > 0. Furthermore, for almost every ￿1 2 ￿1, any
t = 1;:::;T, the adjoint equations















= xt (￿1) = 0; t = 1;:::;T: (44)
Combining together( 42)-(44), and using absolute continuity of the co-state variables, gives (30).
35See, for instance, Theorem 3.7 of Buttazzo, Giaquinta and Hildebrandt (1998). The role of the coercivity condition
in Tonelli￿ s result is exactly to guarantee that the controls u are essentially bounded.
36We abstract from the constraints that ut ￿ K. It is in fact immediate from the fact that K =  
0(￿ e) > 1=￿ that
these constraints never bind.




ct(￿t) if ￿t = ￿t + et(￿t)
￿L otherwise
(45)
with L > 0 arbitrarily large. So, without loss, assume s itself satis￿es condition (45).

















The argument for the case where the inequality is reversed is symmetric. Then consider the following
alternative scheme s#: For any ￿ 6= t;t + 1, any (￿￿;￿￿), s
#
















if ￿t 2 Q and ￿t = ￿t + et(￿t)
￿L if ￿t 2 Q and ￿t 6= ￿t + et(￿t)
;
















if ￿t 2 Q and ￿t+1 = ￿t+1 + et+1(￿t+1)
￿L if ￿t 2 Q and ￿t+1 6= ￿t+1 + et+1(￿t+1)
.
Clearly, this scheme preserves incentives for both truthful revelation and obedience and, in equilib-
rium, gives the agent the same payo⁄as the original scheme s:37 The di⁄erence between the ex-ante
expected cost to the principal under this scheme and under the original scheme s is given by















































2 Q) denotes the ex-ante probability that ~ ￿
t





2Qg[￿] denotes the condi-
tional expectation of [￿] over ￿t given the sigma-algebra generated by the event that ~ ￿
t
2 Q:































The principal can then reduce her expected payment to the agent by switching to a scheme s# with
k < 0 arbitrarily small, contradicting the assumption that s is cost-minimizing.
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